This article examines micro-politics of belonging in the post-socialist outskirts of Berlin-Marzahn, one of new urban immigrant settlement areas in Europe. More specifically, it focuses on what locals perceive as an acceptance-precluding conspicuous presence of nominally white immigrants of German ancestry from the former Soviet Union, the Aussiedler (resettlers). Thus the paper outlines how long-term residents read and interpret these immigrants' everyday embodiments, constructing what I call micro-economies of embodied difference, in order to mark the latter as Eastern-European and thus non-belonging. In order to make sense of such practices, the article examines the embeddedness of this suburban locality in extra-local politics of belonging, showing how Marzahn and its old-time residents have themselves become postwall Berlin's (and Germany's) internal Others, saturated with uncommodifiable traces of now denigrated state-socialist Easternness. I suggest that in such a context these residents' practice of ascription of the unwanted Easternness to recent immigrants works to deflect it in order to buttress their own claims to full membership citizenship in the unified Germany they feel they have been excluded from so far.
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INTRODUCTION
"And so Marzahn became Little Moscow," lamented Lena, a young old-time Marzahner when commenting on the transformation of her locality engendered by the settlement of about 20,000 Russian-speaking migrants of German origin in this northeastern outskirts of Berlin over the past 15 years 3 . During this time Marzahn had become home to the largest concentration of these migrants, the so-called Aussiedler (resettlers/repatriates), in the territory of former East Germany 4 . Their settlement here is a part of the broader trend of diversification of immigrant destinations beyond traditional immigrant gateways across the global north (e.g. Massey, 2008; Fonseca, 2006; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon, 2006; Mahler, 2001) . While in their effort to contribute to a more complex understanding of contemporary political landscapes of immigrant settlement in the US many geographers have turned their attention to such new locations (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008; Nelson, 2008; Veronis, 2006; Mahler and Foner, 1996; Trudeau, 2006) , research in Germany continues to privilege traditional destinations, such as inner-city neighborhoods of West German cities. By examining one of the suburban, and specifically post-socialist milieus of immigrant reception in Germany this article aims for a parallel step in a less-examined European context. 3 Aussiedler make up between 11 and 17% of the local population in northern and central Marzahn, the areas of research focus, respectively (Augustin, 2008) . 4 By 2003 this migration flow counted 2,995,000 people, including Aussiedlers' family members (Oezcan, 2004) . Additional 100,000 to 200,000 Aussiedler arrived since then, based on the data of the Federal statistical office of the FRG. As such these migrants are by now the second largest migrant group in Germany.
I approach the examination of local responses to the arrival of immigrants in Marzahn through the concept of politics of belonging, which centers on discursive processes through which any collective -with its attendant 'we' -gets constructed (Yuval-Davis, 2011) . The paper focuses on boundary-making practices, a crucial component of politics of belonging, unfolding most often through the construction of the "Other" (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Favell, 1999) . Since local milieus are of the utmost importance for the actual prospects of immigrant inclusion (Leitner, 2004) , this paper examines more specifically everyday local practices of Othering, or micropolitics of belonging. At the same time, however, particular places are also embedded in national and regional landscapes of belonging with their dominant discourses -rather than just institutionalized technologies of formal belonging such as citizenship laws -about who counts as a worthy member of the community and who does not. The ways in which citizen subjects understand and enact their belonging in particular places are then situated within such broader frameworks (e.g. Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003; Berdahl, 1999 ). Yet, crucially, regions, cities and neighborhoods are differently positioned within these landscapes, effectuating in turn placebased particularity of local negotiations over belonging. This paper then, secondly, examines the positionality of eastern Berlin in extra-local landscapes of belonging, allowing me to highlight how they continue to be animated by the legacies of Cold War.
The paper unfolds in the following way. I first discuss the existing urban geographies of belonging, Othering and embodiment, highlighting the neglect of nominally white immigrants and of non-visually discernible bodily practices in this scholarship -neglect this paper seeks to redress. A brief outline of the role that the East and East Europeanness have played in the construction of European identity and that of unified Germany is followed by a more specific examination of the positionality and Othering of Marzahn in wider landscapes of belonging in Germany, and in particular in the post-wall Berlin. I then turn to the analysis of how local residents of Marzahn read and construct immigrants' varied embodied everyday practices as signifying their Easternness. I argue that locals' Othering works as a practice of deflection and displacement of Easternness, that they are themselves seen as saturated with, onto these newcomers in order to enhance their own claims for full belonging in Berlin and Germany. In the conclusion I reflect on the implications of this case for studying politics of immigrant belonging in European cities.
In making its argument this article ties together varied sources, including primary and secondary data. The primary data were gathered in Marzahn between February and October 2007 as a part of a project on practices of communal integration projects 5 , during which I was institutionally anchored at two such projects, namely Meridian and Kieztreff, as a part-time volunteer. I draw here especially on the excerpts from focus groups conducted with 43 native-German residents and Aussiedler, which inquired participants about their experiences with migrants or local residents, integration projects and their views about changes in Marzahn. The 5 The project focused on integration projects developed locally over the past decade in response to increased tensions between migrants and native Marzhaner and social isolation of the former.
They are usually funded for 1-3 years by grants available through various partnerships between local, regional or federal governments, and foundations. They offer a variety of services and activities, including free individual consultation and translation services, native-language lectures on issues such as German health-care system, or German and Russian language. Most projects also incorporate social and cultural activities, such as intercultural dinner "cook-ins", weekend dance evenings or weekly breakfasts that are intended to improve local-immigrant relations through increased interactions.
participants were recruited through flyers posted in neighborhoods' commercial and public spaces and with the help of the two community centers housing the above-mentioned projects.
Some of the participants also worked or volunteered in these centers, which allowed me to get to know them more in depth 6 . Crucially, the paper is equally strongly informed by the broader ethnography, namely participant observation and everyday informal conversations with residents I engaged with at casual meetings, neighborhood gatherings, and integration-related events.
Finally, the paper also uses data from a few of the 25 expert interviews conducted with local integration practitioners, politicians and urban planners.
GEOGRAPHIES OF IMMIGRANT BELONGING, OTHERING AND EMBODIMENT
In wake of news about radicalization of some of the immigrant youth and urban tensions involving immigrants in Western Europe, questions about immigrants' belonging and their social incorporation have moved anew to the political limelight over the past decade. These renewed public debates tend to be dominated by the ascription of blame for the social exclusion to 6 Each group discussion lasted about 1.5 hours and took place in the main communal room of the community center housing project Meridian. As the overall project focused primarily on middleaged residents, the largest proportion, 39% of the participants were between 50-60 years of age, 28% between 40-50, 14% between 30-40 and 12% over 60. 3 (7%) of the participants were under 30. Especially native German groups were gender balanced with 55% of participants being women. About one third of participants had college degrees, and one German participant was pursuing graduate studies at the time. With the exception of three native German subjects, all the other participants experienced de-skilling/underemployment after 1989 or their settlement in Germany, as well as precarious employment and in some cases also long-term unemployment (lasting more than 6 months).
immigrants themselves, rather than by the discussions of how state and so-called host society attitudes and practices contribute to immigrants' socio-economic and cultural marginalization. It has been precisely the socio-spatial relations between the receiving society and migrant newcomers, and in particular varied dynamics of everyday negotiations between them that involve claims of rightful belonging, that Patricia Ehrkamp and Helga Leitner (2006) have suggested as a much-needed focus of urban migration geographers. In response scholarship has highlighted how for example immigrants' transformations of neighborhood landscapesespecially more permanent and visible changes effecting the built environment that attest to immigrants' close involvement with local milieus -spark intense contestations (e.g. Ehrkamp, 2005; Trudeau, 2006; Mitchell, 2004b) . Others have shown how locals often racialize those parts of their towns most associated with immigrant presence in an effort to spatially fix and distanciate themselves from immigrants perceived, and simultaneously constructed, as different (e.g. Leitner, 2011; Hiemstra, 2010) . Such racialization unfolds through varied processes, including locals' hierarchical interpretations of immigrant expressions of masculinity or femininity, as Patricia Ehrkamp (2008) has shown in a case of 'Turkish' neighborhood in the German city of Duisburg. Others have highlighted how different local histories of political mobilization and race relations result in geographical unevenness of immigrant-native landscapes of belonging (Nelson and Hiemstra, 2008; Winders, 2006) . Much of this writing approaches politics of everyday belonging as a micro-political process that involves negotiations over sociocultural identifications within a context of uneven power relations. As Mee and Wright have argued, such negotiations are "inherently geographic" (2009, p. 772) because they pivot on boundary-making processes that are underpinned by competing conceptions about the appropriateness of certain bodies and practices in particular places and communities (see also Trudeau, 2006 , Antonsich 2010 .
Drawing on the understanding of identities as relational and contingent, some of the research on immigrant belonging has focused more specifically on processes of Othering. In social constructivist approaches it is through such drawing of a difference between oneself and "the Other" that one's own identity is established and valorized. Geographers have additionally stressed how habitual national and regional media and state constructions of immigrants as nonbelonging Others often provide a credible resource that the 'natives' draw on in the everyday life (e.g. Kastoryano, 2002; Pratt, 2005) . In Germany for example, state-sanctioned legal categorization of migrants as foreigners (Ausländer) contributed for a long time to a quotidian understanding of migrants as Germans' Others (e.g. Vertovec, 1996; Ehrkamp, 2006) , rather than potentially Germans-in-the-making.
Much of the existing scholarship on Othering has traditionally focused on the representations of Others, especially in media and literary cultural production (e.g. Ridanpää, 2007; Jansson, 2003; Dodds, 2003) . As cultural geographer Michael Haldrup and his colleagues have argued, the extent to which exclusions from belonging through marking the Other have been effectuated through "banal, bodily and sensuous practices" of everyday encounters has been rather underestimated (2006, p. 173) . Moreover, the work that has focused on such practices has often neglected varied nature of embodied materiality in favor of "visual objectification of Others", reinforcing the "methodological ocular centrism" of social sciences (Haldrup et al., 2006, p. 182) . While public visuality remains crucial to the processes of racialization and
Othering (e.g. Ehrkamp, 2008) , these other aspects of embodiment, in particular the auditory, are also highly salient to everyday politics, if in potentially more subtle ways (see e.g. Smith, 1997) .
Finally, much migration writing on embodied encounters focuses primarily on processes of Othering as they occur between white local residents and those immigrants conventionally accepted as non-white. This lack of attention to the construction of difference amongst somatically 'same' or highly alike subjects has also been characteristic of whiteness studies (e.g.
van Riemsdijk, 2010 ). Yet native residents also often read and construct nominally white immigrant bodies as different. In her discussion of the Irish migrant women in London, Breda Gray (2002) for example draws on Alison Bailey's (1998) Before I turn to examine the specificities of such micro-economies in case of Aussiedler in Berlin-Marzahn, I first outline the role that Othering has played in the construction of Europe, and more specifically in post-wall Germany.
BELONGING IN EUROPE: OTHERING, THE EAST AND THE CASE OF UNIFIED

GERMANY
As has often been remarked, self-understanding of Europe has to a large extent developed through a particular kind of Othering, namely orientalization. The East has played a constitutive role in the European identity construction for several hundred years; ever since the East-West divide replaced an earlier South-North divide (Wolff, 1994) . As Edward Said (1979) has shown, (Western) Europe constructed its identity as the bearer of progress and Enlightenment modernity through the construction of "the East", the Orient, as its inferior Other. This intellectual project focused geographically on the Ottoman empire and Egypt, drawing a strong boundary between them and Europe, and positing them as Europe's constitutive outside. Closer to home, the construction of territories east of the Austrian half of the Habsburg empire specifically as
Eastern Europe unfolded through the same binary logic. Certainly, Eastern Europe did not become essentialized to the same extent as the classical Orient, imagined as steeped in barbarity and unreason. Still, through "demi-orientalization" Eastern Europe found itself cast as Europe's internal Other, at best forever lagging behind (Wolff, 1994, p.7) . Due to its historical closeness to the Ottomans, the Balkans, in particular became seen as geographically of Europe, but culturally outside of it (Hammond, 2007; Todorova, 1997) . Russia, posited as (West) Europe's pupil, as "just having been tamed, civil, civilized", has historically equally played a crucial role in the European self-conception, including during the post-WWII division (Neumann, 1999, p. 110; Said, 1979) . And it was precisely the Cold-war era that solidified Eastern Europe, historically a rather unstable formation and concept, as the antithesis of the capitalist and democratic (Western) Europe (Kuus, 2004) .
Germany found itself, as a divided country, in a very particular position within this larger geopolitical environment. While prior to the rise of the Nazi regime it considered itself long a
Central European nation par excellence, straddling the West and the East, over the second half of the 20 th century its image and self-understanding changed into that of a country culturally inherently located within Western Europe (e.g. Palmowski, 2008) . This was of course the case only for the Federal republic of Germany (FRG). Nevertheless, it was the FRG that portrayed itself as the legitimate representative of the whole German national and cultural community.
And, crucially, it was the FRG and its geopolitical imaginary of Germany as firmly of Europe/the West that came to gain hegemonic currency after 1989. After all, the unification of former West and East Germanies was the process of joining of equal parts -that the term itself evokes -only in the name. As Germany's leading public intellectuals forewarned, the unexpectedly speedy unification only exacerbated the Cold-war era power differentials between the two (e.g. Habermas, 1998) . Many in the East came to see the process rather as one of internal colonization (see e.g. Mandel, 2008) .
Strong celebratory moment that unification elicited quickly gave way to a deep disappointment of former subjects of German democratic republic (GDR) over their nominal sameness and equality with the "old" citizens. Media accounts turned to differences between East and West Germans, or more specifically to the ways in which Easterners differed from Westerners, implicitly positing the latter as proper citizens of unified Germany to be emulated by the "newcomers". Reflecting the domination of German media and political landscape by the West such differences were then "constructed hierarchically", allocating "German 'genealogical heritage'" to the (former) West, and in turn producing East German marginalization (Hörschelmann, 2001, p. 986) . Such region-based Othering, embedded in particular geopolitical histories, is ubiquitous in most countries (see e.g. Ridanpää, 2007; Jansson, 2003 on south-north differentiation in Finland and the US respectively). What is of importance in the German case is the role that Easternness, reflecting a broader Europe-making project, played, and, as I show, continues to play, in the hierarchization of German citizenship today.
Unification brought a number of peculiar developments, including the birth of an Ossi.
Or rather, Ossi, an old pejorative term for Easterners derived from the German word for East (Ost), came to connote former GDR citizens in a wide-spread national discourse. Ossis came to be continuously constructed also in everyday encounters, through not least the Wessis'
interpretation of East Germans' bodily practices (e.g. Berdahl, 1999) 7 . While these have over time refocused on more subtle differences, recent research suggests that oft-evoked "mental wall" not only persists but that it has recently intensified, including amongst the youth (e.g. Schroeder, 2006) . As the spokesman of Social democratic party (SPD) for immigrant integration in Marzahn, a university student in his mid-twenties, opined in our interview: "Even between the West Germans and the East Germans here in Berlin, even if they live close to each other....this imaginary wall, this border still exists for many people, I belong to that generation, too" (GL, male, 20-30). Many former East Germans continue to feel as second-class citizens, homeless and out of place in unified Germany, establishment of which was pervaded by the devaluation of 'all things East German' (Hörschelmann, 2002; Berdahl, 1999; Boym, 2001) . Additionally, I suggest that Marzahners' position from which they negotiate their belonging in Berlin and in Germany is doubly interesting. This is so because in addition to their socialist experience shared with other 7 In the early 1990s bodily markers such as "pale faces, oily hair, poor dental work, washed-out formless jeans, generic gray shoes, and acrylic shopping bags" as well as perceived olfactory differences such as body odor dominated this process (Berdahl, 1999, p. 167) . These were over time replaced by others, such as those related to body language or more subtle expressions of a lack of a "cultural fluency in consumption" (Berdahl, 1999, p. 159 
MARZAHN AS BERLIN'S REMNANT OF THE EAST
The fall of the wall, accompanied by the 1991 relocation of the capital from Bonn, certainly opened up the opportunities for socio-political and cultural re-integration of the previously divided city. Yet city planners and politicians concentrated rather on the attraction of investment and capital in their quest to make Berlin into a "global city", a city that would be on par with other (West) European metropolises (Krätke, 2001; Cochrane, 2006; Raiser and Volkmann, 2003) . Post-wall Berlin's relationality to the East has proved to be, at best, ambivalent in this process. Local political elites had for example initially hoped, if rather futilely, for the economic capitalization of the Berlin's geographic proximity to the former Eastern block (Cochrane, 1999) . Mimicking the national discourse, they posited the city as a 'bridge' between Western and Eastern Europe (Mandel, 2008) . But when large numbers of circular and more permanent migrants from post-socialist countries crossed that, figuratively speaking, bridge, the city reacted with discourses bemoaning Berlin's 'eastern-europeanization' (Rada, 2001) .
Concrete place-and image-making processes after 1989 also made the undesirability of Eastern Europeanness in the city clear. Compared to other post-socialist cities, material legacies of state-socialism were for example excised from Berlin's landscape in a particularly speedy and obsessive manner (e.g. Colomb, 2007) . The decision to replace the GDR parliament building with a replica of the 18 th century Royal Palace, the culmination of this process, in particular epitomized the city's underlying orientation to represent its post-1989 existence as a continuation of its pre-1933 past, portrayed as a 'traditional' (West) European city (Colomb, 2007) . Its statesocialist and East European past, seen as an aberration, became in the process confined to a few select locations readied for tourist consumption.
Making of new Berlin's identity has additionally involved its representation as a hip mecca of internationalism (Vertovec, 1996) . While politicians often focus on inner-city districts such as Kreuzberg or Wedding as problematic localities in need of special management because of the high concentration of impoverished residents of Turkish and Arab origin, these once devalued margins of West Berlin have simultaneously become associated with the image of cool "Multi-Kulti" Berlin (Düspohl, 2005; Kil, 2006) . Similarly some eastern parts of the city, such as
Prenzlauer Berg or Friedrichshain have been included in this post-modern cosmopolitan urbanity as they turned into desired places of residence and entertainment for young professionals and artists (e.g. Levine, 2004) . Not so Marzahn, discredited routinely as "not the real Berlin", by
Berliners outside of Marzahn I engaged with.
[Insert Figure 1 ]
Marzahn's marginality in the present-day Berlin presents in fact quite a reversal of its pre-1989 fortunes. One of the five localities of the district of Marzahn-Hellersdorf (see Figure 1 ), it was constructed at the end of the 1980s as a part of the GDR's push to relieve nation-wide housing shortages (e.g. Castillo, 2001) . Before 1989 such housing estates were rather coveted residential areas offering modern, family-sized housing with facilities unavailable in dilapidated inner city apartments that almost half of Marzahner resided in before moving here (Hübner et al., 1999) . Marzahn became additionally attractive thanks to its abundance of green spaces. After the unification, however, such pre-fabricated housing estates came to represent "inhuman modernism, concretized collectivism, and the ghettos of tomorrow" (Kil and Silver 2006, p. 111 ). And Marzahn, as the largest such an estate, home to almost 200,000 people in its heyday in the late 1980s (Hübner et al., 1999) , became an "object of contempt" par excellence (Kil and Silver, 2006, p. 101 ).
Marzahn's initial negative image in post-wall Berlin as a particularly gloomy and crimeridden Eastern periphery (e.g. Rueschemeyer, 1993) Figure 2 ).
[Insert Figures 2 & 3]
While Marzahn's landscape has indeed changed slightly over the past decade as many apartment blocks were retrofitted with new facades and some high-rises were scaled down (see Figure 3 ) 11 , the image presented in the campaign is still a highly selective one, since most of buildings 10 Interview with Ms Cremer, Head of the UrbanPlan Ltd. running the program; July 2007 remain in more or less the original state (see Figure 4 ). The second round of the campaign brought an even more explicit attempt at ridding Marzahn's image of its Eastern connotations. Its signature mental map for example invited the viewer to see Marzahn as unequivocally a part of not only Western Europe, but also of West -represented by New York City -more broadly (see community -that of Vietnamese origin -only counting about 2,000 members (Augustin, 2008) .
Marzahn is thus lacking any sizeable non-white minorities that tend to be associated with multicultural diversity. And second, Aussiedler do not fit this scheme also because for the to 31% in 1998 (Dietz, 1999) . more easily established, in particular somatic difference -they claim commensurate Germanness. These old women in particular were seen as changing Marzahn's landscape with their bodies, occupying the space in a fashion inconsistent with that of a modern German urbanite. As a mode of embodiment it was associated with an imagined geography of a cold, peasant Russian East. In Andreas's description these elderly women seemed to be particularly saturated with a visible difference. A conventional German expression he used, "die fallen sofort ins Auge", literally translated as "they immediately fall into one's eye", also assigns the blame for being seen and noticed to the immigrants. While another focus group participant, Heike (F, 50-60) commented on how terrible it was to judge people by their appearance, others stepped in to confirm the validity of Andreas's unease:
Hanna (F, 50-60) : The question is where the threshold is. You can say what you want, it all sounds nice, but when you don't know the person that you come across and his appearance says nothing to you, you react differently to him than to someone who's standing next to you and whose appearance is familiar to you.
Heike (F, 50-60): That's natural.
Felix (M, 20-30) : Clothes make a man.
Sophie (F, 30-40) : I think that, just like in other countries, they should adjust here a little bit.
If reminded that these old women in headscarves were in the first place just a tiny minority of Aussiedler, locals would point out other ways in which they saw Aussiedler women as different from German ones:
With women one can tell from for example the earrings… I mean, even when they're so stylishly dressed, you can always find a little spot that lets you know exactly that that's an Aussiedler woman…For example, it's the red gold, we have yellow gold and the strong orientation towards extended family in Germany: "The thing with the extended family is also a question of time. Industrialization means that it eventually doesn't exist [here] anymore and the same thing will happen to Russians". That Aussiedlers' reliance on their family networks might have been a coping strategy with migration-induced loss of other social capital is besides the point. After all, such a "veridical deficit" is not the main issue with Othering and orientalizing discourses (Isin, 2005, p. 32) . The point I want to make is that such a spatiotemporal Othering of Aussiedler subjects' cultural practices that Marzahner claim not to engage in anymore, posits these immigrants as culturally out-of-time and thus out-of-place in the modern Germany that Marzahn simultaneously becomes an integral part of.
Audible Economies of Difference
While local residents drew on Aussiedlers' visually observable bodily practices, these immigrants' audible practices played an equally strong role in everyday constructions of their difference. Old-time Marzahner complained regularly especially about the Aussiedler youth:
They're making noise, or shall I say they roar as they drag down the Schwarzburger While these residents disapproved also of local German youth drinking outdoors late at night,
Aussiedler youth were singled out as appropriating public space in an improper, too audible, and almost savage way. Importantly, locals often tied the charge of an inappropriately loud selfexpression of Aussiedler to the imagined pre-migration socialization of these immigrants in a wide-open steppe of Russia.
The geographic imaginary of Russia, including the Central Asian territories it used to rule over, as a vast cold steppe with extended families living communally in rural dwellings, figured also in a common charge of Aussiedler as invaders of private spaces of locals' homes, their apartments and apartment buildings. Aussiedler were begrudged, as other immigrants often are, for increasing levels of noise due to their overcrowding, perceived as a long-formed, environmentally-conditioned 'habit', as the following quote aptly epitomizes:
There's 10 to 12 of them living in an apartment for 2 people, really great housing...they know it from back then, [having had] only one room. Even when they had more rooms at their disposal they never used them, they only stayed in one room, huddling together. (Lena, F, (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) While such allegations of overcrowding have no real basis (e.g. Augustin, 2008) , I want to point out here once again locals' culturalist -rather than for example economistic -reasoning of this putative behavior. Such culture-based explanations were underpinned by and further perpetuated the imaginary of Aussiedler as immigrants hailing from the Russian East diametrically different from Marzahn.
For their part, migrants themselves also shared many stories regarding conflicts with their local German neighbors over noise; be it in cases involving active or crying children, late-night talks, or renovations of their apartments. Sometimes Aussiedler seized onto the concept of a boisterous Russian in order to disparage local residents, positing them in turn as cold and lacking in care for others:
We needed to put a nail into the wall, and there he went, he called the police. In the [Soviet] Union we got used to talking loudly, and here -whispering. Please, write this down, Germans are born quietly, get married quietly and die quietly. In Russia (u nas),
we have jolly marriages, births, baptisms and deaths, too. We celebrate it all. But here…they like dogs more than people. (Irina, F, over 60)
Several exchanges later however, Irina, along with several other participants, pleaded with her peers to decrease their audible conspicuousness by speaking quieter in public. The issue became of utmost importance in particular in relation to the Aussiedler youth, whom the parent and grand-parents critiqued heavily and unanimously for speaking Russian loudly on purpose of "getting back" at local Germans' reluctance to accept them as Germans.
The issue of alleged loudness is strongly connected with the fact that it is not just any foreign language that Aussiedler speak. For a great majority of the Aussiedler Russian had become their first language over the last two generations. This linguistic assimilation in the Soviet Union resulted from a loss of cultural autonomy and cultural rights to for example
German-language schooling, as well as high rates of intermarriage following mass deportations of German settlers from culturally autonomous regions on the Volga during the World War II (Münz and Ohliger, 1998 Those who claimed lack of any such aversion, like Heike (F, 50-60), were in fact charged with "having truly believed in the system". The accusatory tone of such a response points to the fact that while such antipathy towards the Soviets, and by extension to the Russian language and its speakers, might have certainly been a part of the experience of many GDR citizens, presentday interpretations of former east Germans' relation to the regime have been also strongly shaped by the negative appraisal of the East German state-socialist experiment in the context of Europeanness that would enhance their claim to first-class citizenship as proper Germans.
CONCLUSION
Contemporary European landscape of immigrant settlement has become characterized not only by migrants' dispersal to smaller cities, suburban and even rural areas, but also by their increasing ethno-cultural, racial and religious heterogeneity. Such developments have brought about an increased diversification of forms of contestations of belonging, including new patterns of segregation, racism and prejudice, or experiences of space and cross-cultural contact that provide new avenues for urban migration research (e.g. Vertovec, 2007) . That much research continues nonetheless to focus on the largest non-white minorities might be understandable in so far as these seem to dominate national imaginaries of difference and belonging, not least because the 'host' society's acceptance of migrants continues to be conditional to a large extent on their invisibility (e.g. Valentine, 2010; Ehrkamp, 2008; Fortier, 2005 ).
Yet, as this paper shows, what constitutes visibility varies depending on the local context.
While Aussiedler as white-bodied subjects might be less visible and construed as less of a "problem" in Berlin than migrants of Turkish or Kurdish origin, in Marzahn they are at the center of everyday politics of belonging. Aussiedlers' visibility and difference is constructed in the everyday life through local residents' reading and interpretation of how the formers' bodies dress, behave, maintain and adorn themselves, as well as speak differently from what is the accepted norm of Germanness. The publicity or conspicuousness of bodies out of place has then an important auditory dimension, even if audible difference is easier to conceal. The auditory is certainly not limited only to the experience of hearing a foreign language or accent, which are themselves often ranked from more to less acceptable. Yet in countries like Germany, namely countries with a strong legacy of a conception of the nation as a linguistic community, the native-level fluency of the dominant language is a prime marker of belonging. And as Anne-Marie Fortier (2003) pointed out, in specific time periods such cultural markers might other and ethnicize migrants more than somatic differences.
As clear from the case of Marzahn, significance of such markers is circumscribed also by the specificity of local contexts in concrete places. This specificity includes, crucially, geopolitical legacies of relations between the countries of origin and settlement, which impinge on the conditions of immigrant settlement (see e.g. Fortier, 2003 Fortier, , 2000 Nagel, 2002) . In postunified Germany and Berlin, such legacies -namely those of Cold war era division and the inequitable unification that followed -additionally permeate and shape internal contexts of belonging. Here places like Marzahn, and their residents, find themselves cast into a position of an internal Other -not quite new Berliner nor proper German -because they seem saturated with those uncommodifiable traces of now castigated state-socialist Easternness that threatens the dominant conception of Germanness. The sizeable and palpable everyday presence of Russianspeaking migrants in this post-socialist suburb has then become a source of particular resentment for locals as it is seen as reinforcing locality's association with such Easternness. Territorial closeness of these white, East-associated bodies has, if also somewhat paradoxically, become even more uncomfortable because of Aussiedlers' claims to authentic Germanness. In such a context locals' marking of Aussiedler as the authentic Easterners instead has worked to displace the Marzahn-associated Easternness onto these migrants, constructing them as the subjects in whom the East resides.
Such a practice of buttressing of one's own (West) Europeanness through an ascription of Eastern Europeanness to others became rather commonplace in post-1989 Europe, as Eastern Europe became a highly unstable cultural construction (e.g. Kuus, 2004; Wolff, 1994) . If for example Polish or Slovak political elites resurrected the category of Central Europe in their attempt to join the European Union and NATO -a project conceived of as a "return to Europe"it was to mark those countries further to the east, such as Ukraine, as properly Eastern European and thus not quite fit, unlike themselves, for the membership (Agnew, 2001; Haldrup et al., 2006) . The latter in turn used such a strategy towards their own eastern neighbors (Neumann, 1999; Neofistos, 2008; Bakic-Hayden, 1995) . This attribute of Easternness/Eastern Europeanness continues to be, however, crucial -if possibly not to the same degree as in previous decade -also in quotidian negotiations of belonging amid white European subjects, underpinning, as I have shown, micro-economies of embodied differences that reproduce citizenship hierarchies.
The case of post-socialist eastern Berlin might be quite specific due to the persistence of Cold war era cleavage within the country's regime of citizenship and belonging. Still its specificity is valuable in that it reveals, if in a particularly sharp way, the myth of an integrated society -both at an urban and national scale -that immigrants encounter and in which they are thought to strive for acceptance and inclusion. While Marzahner as Germany's post-socialist subjects explicitly tied their own lack of cultural and socio-economic integration and inclusion within the unified Germany to that of Aussiedler, similar axes of differentiated belonging run through any society. Citizenship, as an expression of belonging, is after all based not only on the exclusion of those deemed foreign because they lack formal citizenship status. In any given polity there are also always those citizen-status bearers who are considered more valuable than others, despite the putative equality of liberal citizenship. Such axes of differentiation are multiple, running along class, racial, regional and religious lines, and congeal in different configurations in concrete cities and their neighborhoods. In other words, multiple differently scaled contexts of marginality work themselves into everyday landscapes of social relations lived, navigated and constructed by the interaction of immigrants and long-term residents.
Sensitivity to so-called internal politics of citizenship and belonging needs to become an integral part of examinations of longer-term residents' interactions with varied populations of immigrants in European cities. In Marzahn's case such a consideration serves, as I hoped to show, not to excuse many of its residents' anti-Aussiedler attitudes but rather to avoid pitfalls of simply reinforcing the West-dominated discourses about xenophobic Ossis that seek in turn to underline 
